A Response to the Reformed Forum on Cornelius Van Til: Part Two

For those readers of my blog who may have stumbled across this post and who do not know what this is all about, I recommend that you familiarize yourself with the context before reading this post. Otherwise, this post isn’t going to make a lot of sense.

Here is a brief rundown of the relevant context.

In November 2024, my book Toward a Reformed Apologetics: A Critique of the Thought of Cornelius Van Til was published. It is, as the subtitle indicates, a critique of the teaching of Cornelius Van Til.

On February 7, 2025, the Reformed Forum, a podcast run by men who are proponents of the teaching of Van Til, aired a 90-minute podcast devoted to an in-depth criticism of my book. They indicated that this would be the first of maybe 3 or 4 podcasts devoted to my book.

On February 8, 2025, The Reformed Forum aired an hour long live chat devoted to a discussion of the previous day’s episode.

On March 3, 2025, I wrote a lengthy blog post responding to the Reformed Forum’s podcasts of February 7 and 8.

Although not directly in response to the Reformed Forum, on March 24, I also posted a lengthy response to Richard Gaffin’s important 1995 journal article on 1 Corinthians 2:6–16 and its relation to Van Til’s teaching.

A little over three months later, on July 4, 2025, the Reformed Forum released the second podcast in their series dedicated to a critique of my book.

The post you are now reading is in response to the July 4 Reformed Forum podcast.

Now that we have all of that straight, let me say that I regret the five-month delay, but it was unavoidable. When the July 4 podcast aired, I was in the middle of a new course prep (IYKYK), and that was taking all of my time and energy. I knew that if I listened to the podcast at that time, I would be distracted in a desire to continue the discussion right away and I wouldn’t finish my course prep. Then the Fall semester began and the responsibilities of daily teaching took over.

But now I have finally had time to listen to the entire second podcast and compose this response. The “pace of the church” is a phrase I heard mentioned several times in this podcast, so we can blame it on that, I suppose.

Because of the nature and structure of the discussion on the July 4 podcast, I think the best way for me to proceed is to focus on the handful of major topics that were discussed at length by the Reformed Forum panel, and I want to begin with the most obvious one.

The Omniscience Thesis

In the Reformed Forum’s first podcast on February 7, Carlton Wynne said, “Mathison makes the claim that Van Til believed that man must know all about all things in order to know anything about anything.” A bit later he added that it is clear that Mathison charges Van Til with saying that man must be omniscient. The Reformed Forum panel spent at least 30 minutes of the first podcast criticizing me for charging Van Til with this teaching. In their second podcast, the panel begins referring to this idea as “the omniscience thesis,” and I am again accused of attributing this to Van Til.

I have to say that is a bit frustrating because in my March 3 response to the first podcast (and live chat), I made it clear that I do not believe Van Til taught any such thing, and that I do not charge Van Til with any such teaching. I think Van Til was wrong on some things. I don’t think he was a delusional nut, which is what he’d have to be to believe or teach something like this so-called “omniscience thesis.” In my March 3 response I even provided 15 or 16 quotes from my book where I observe that Van Til makes it abundantly clear that God alone is or can be omniscient and that because man is finite, man cannot possibly be omniscient. On this point, I am in complete agreement with the Reformed Forum panel. Van Til does not say that man is, can be, or must be omniscient.

However, despite my own explanation of my words in my book, and despite the numerous quotes I provided, the Reformed Forum panel, in this second podcast, spends another half hour or so criticizing me for espousing “the omniscience thesis.” Even after acknowledging my clear denial of attributing “the omniscience thesis” to Van Til in my March 3 blog response, one of the panel members says: “more specifically, I do believe that the claim that Van Til believed that man must know all about all things in order to know anything about anything, persists and re-emerges particularly in the second half of the book.” The others on the panel agree.

In other words, even though I clearly explained that I do not believe Van Til taught this thesis, and even though the panel acknowledges that I clearly said in my response to them that Van Til did not teach this thesis, they assert in the July 4 podcast that I actually do say that Van Til taught this thesis (??). For eighty years, Van Tillians have regularly responded to criticisms of Van Til by saying, “This person misunderstands Van Til.” I may be the first critic of Van Til to be accused not merely of misunderstanding Van Til but also of misunderstanding myself. How in the world do I respond when my interlocutors claim they know what I mean and that I don’t? Dr. Tipton has spoken of a "hermeneutic of suspicion" on several occasions in this discussion. As I see it, rejecting my own statement of what I mean is a hermeneutic of suspicion on steroids.

Anyone who has read my book or followed this discussion at any length knows that one of my primary goals has been to move the historic discussion about Van Til in a more constructive direction, beyond all the insults and animosity of the past. I also want this particular discussion between me and the panel of pastors and teachers at the Reformed Forum to be a mutually respectful discussion among brothers in Christ. It is difficult to see how that can happen, however, if my own explanation of what I am saying in my book is dismissed in such a cavalier manner.

In my March 3 post, I assumed that the Reformed Forum panel concluded I teach this omniscience thesis in my book due to a misunderstanding somewhere. That happens sometimes. I made a point of saying that I know these are men of good character, and so I do not believe the initial misunderstanding was due to sinful motives. It was just an honest misunderstanding. I still believe that to be the case. I refuse to believe that these men are engaging me with deliberately malicious motives. But, even in spite of my own explanation of my own writing, in this second podcast, rather than say, “Oh, perhaps we misunderstood Mathison,” the panel effectively says, “Mathison doesn’t even understand what he wrote. In spite of his clear denial that he attributes the omniscience thesis to Van Til, he does, in fact, attribute the omniscience thesis to Van Til.”

That’s a rather patronizing way to respond to my explanation of my words in my book. How is such a rejection of an author’s own explanation a charitable reading? In what other context would a reader reject an author’s explanation of his own writing? I do not know if the panel is aware of this, but by rejecting my own explanation of what I wrote, the clear implication is that I’m either a duplicitous liar, or an imbecile, or perhaps both. Again, I do not believe any of these men have evil motives, but objectively that is what their rejection of my explanation entails whether they are aware of it or not. I’m frankly curious as to why they are more open to the possibility that I’m a liar or an idiot than they are to the possibility that they may have misunderstood what I wrote?

I find that incredibly perplexing. I suspect that they would find it at least perplexing if anyone ever responded in a similar manner to something they said or wrote. Again, I do not believe they are doing this with sinful motives, but I can think of only two charitable interpretations of their insistence that I affirm the omniscience thesis in spite of my explicit rejection of it. One possibility is that the misunderstanding is due to the inherently confusing way Van Til himself writes on this topic. He will sometimes state his definition of true knowledge in such a way that it could sound like he was espousing the omniscience thesis if his words were not read in the fuller context of his thought. So perhaps when I quote these words from Van Til in order to show how he assumes the idealist definition of true knowledge, the Reformed Forum panel is reading his words in isolation from what he says about the necessarily finite nature of man’s knowledge.

Another possibility is that they are so immersed in Van Tillianism that they are reading me through Van Tillian colored glasses and simply cannot imagine how I could really be saying what I’m saying. Most Van Tillians seem to be unable to comprehend how anyone in their right mind could possibly disagree with Van Til (What he says is just basic Sunday School 101, right?), so perhaps that is part of it. I disagree with Van Til. I must not be in my right mind. I have to be squeezed into these pre-conceived Van Tillian categories. My explanation of what I wrote can be dismissed. I can be patted on the head and handed some jumbo crayons while the words “Bless his heart” echo in the background.

Although it is a bit discouraging to have to spend so much time talking about a point on which the Reformed Forum panel and I actually agree, I have been left with no choice because they have spent at least an hour on this point over the course of two podcasts, and there are a lot of Reformed Forum listeners who are now probably convinced that I have made this blatantly false claim about Van Til. In other words, because of this podcast, a lot of people now believe a complete falsehood about what I said in my book. This could be settled rather easily if these listeners were to read my book, but I know many won’t. It’s far easier to dismiss the book outright when you think I am making such absurd claims about Van Til. Such a book can’t possibly be worth reading.

So, allow me to attempt once again to explain what I am and am not saying with regards to Van Til’s comments about omniscience. I will first provide a brief summary, and then I will follow this with a more detailed walk through the chapters of my book to show (again) what I am actually saying about Van Til. I apologize in advance because such an approach is borderline pedantic. Actually, no. It’s not borderline. It’s first in show, pure-bred pedantic. But what other option do I have when I am being publicly accused of saying something about Van Til that is the exact opposite of what I actually say about Van Til?

“Lemme ‘splain. No, there is too much. Let me sum up”

In a nutshell, according to Van Til, God, and God alone, is omniscient. God alone has exhaustive knowledge. God knows himself infinitely and comprehensively. God has also decreed whatsoever comes to pass, so God knows all decreed facts in relation to himself and in relation to each other within the unity of his eternal plan. All facts are therefore “pre-interpreted” by God. There are no “brute facts.”

Man is a finite creature. Man’s knowledge is also necessarily finite. Man can never have exhaustive knowledge. Man is not and can never be omniscient. That is metaphysically impossible. Man’s knowledge, however, is true as far as it goes if it corresponds with God’s perfect exhaustive knowledge. Man is called by God to reason analogically, that is, to make God his final interpretive principle. Fallen man refuses to do this and makes himself the final principle of interpretation. He suppresses the knowledge of God, and he reasons univocally. Because he refuses to make God the final principle of interpretation, fallen man knows nothing truly.

There is an absolute ethical antithesis between two kinds of human beings: covenant keepers and covenant breakers. There is also an absolute antithesis between the two systems of interpretation: the one that makes God the final hermeneutical principle and the one that rejects God as the final hermeneutical principle. Things get more complicated in practice, however, because concrete individuals are at present not yet fully consistent with their systems of interpretation. Some are more and some are less consistent. Complete epistemological consistency will not happen until the eschaton and the final separation of covenant keepers and covenant breakers. Until then, we find both believers and unbelievers reasoning inconsistently with their systems of interpretation. Because of the inconsistency of the unbeliever, he does have some knowledge that is true as far as it goes, even though his principle, if followed with complete consistency, would leave him with no knowledge at all.

Now, so far, this is not terribly difficult to follow, whether you agree with all of it or not. The difficulty and potential confusion about omniscience comes in when Van Til makes statements related to the definition of true knowledge. He everywhere assumes an idealist definition of true knowledge in which in order for any fact to be known truly, all facts have to be known. This definition appears in his writings from his earliest years to his last years. This can easily create confusion at times because Van Til will often state this definition of true knowledge in such a way that it sounds like he is saying that human beings themselves have to be omniscient in order to have knowledge of anything. Many of the Van Til quotes the Reformed Forum is using to support their claim that I affirm the omniscience thesis are these kinds of quotes. But that is not what Van Til is saying. His definition of true knowledge is not the same thing as the so-called omniscience thesis. Nor does he think that it entails the omniscience thesis.

Because of his assumption of the idealist definition of true knowledge, what Van Til does say is that there has to be exhaustive knowledge somewhere if there is to be true knowledge anywhere. For the Christian, this epistemological problem is solved by God, who is omniscient. I think some of the confusion can appear when Van Til says that if man rejects God, then omniscience has to exist in man in order for there to be true knowledge. He says this because he believes exhaustive omniscience has to exist somewhere. If not God, then man. But he never says that man can actually fulfill this requirement. Man can never actually be omniscient, so if there were no omniscient God, according to Van Til’s view, there would simply be no possibility of any knowledge.

In short, I do not claim that Van Til says, “man must know all about all things in order to know anything about anything.” What he says is that such exhaustive knowledge must exist somewhere if there is to be true knowledge. He also does say that if we reject God, then man would have to be omniscient, but he also always and everywhere asserts that this is impossible. He’s saying to the unbeliever that if he rejects God he puts himself in an impossible epistemological situation. Man would have to replace God as the required being where omniscience is located, and that’s impossible.

There are a lot more details and nuances in Van Til regarding the nature of human knowledge, but the main point I want to make here is that Van Til did not teach the omniscience thesis. Nor do I say in my book that he taught this thesis. My criticism in the book is focused on Van Til’s unbiblical idealist definition of true knowledge and the incoherence this definition creates in theology.

An admittedly pedantic walk-through

What I said above in this post and in my previous March 3 response should suffice, but based on this second July 4 podcast, I’m not entirely sure it will. It seems clear that I’m going to have to do more to prove that I am not hiding the omniscience thesis up my sleeve in my book.

Therefore, in what follows, I am going to walk through exactly what I say about Van Til on this point in my book. Remember, in the first five chapters, I am attempting to set forth Van Til’s views. So what do I actually say that Van Til taught on this point in the book?

Chapter 1 of my book is titled “The Triune God.”

The first substantive mention of omniscience in the book is found on p. 43 in a discussion of the attributes of God. Van Til clearly affirms God’s complete omniscience. I also point out here “that according to Van Til, it is in God’s omniscience that we discover the solution to the problem of human knowledge.” As noted above, God solves the problem because, according to Van Til, there has to be exhaustive knowledge somewhere if there is to be true knowledge anywhere. God is the “somewhere” that exhaustive knowledge is found. Human knowledge, however, is not discussed at this point in the book.

On page 47, I discuss Van Til’s doctrine of the divine decree, which is included in God’s exhaustive knowledge. The decree encompasses all facts. Furthermore, “Because God’s decree or plan encompasses all facts, the meaning of all decreed facts is necessarily related to the God who decreed them.” On page 48, I continue by explaining that for Van Til, every fact has its meaning within the unified plan of God. The meaning of every fact is related to God. Also, “because every fact is related to the God who decreed it, every fact is also related to every other fact within God’s unified divine decree.” Because of this: “Facts are truly understood or known only when they are known in relation to God and to all other facts in the plan of God.” This is why there are no “brute facts” for Van Til (p. 49). “Instead of being brute facts, the facts that God decrees are already interpreted facts.”

I then explain that for Van Til: “Because God is omniscient, God fully knows all of the facts he has eternally decreed and fully knows the relation of every fact to himself and to every other fact. This means that in eternity, all decreed facts are already ‘God-interpreted’ facts. Furthermore, since God’s eternal plan is a unitary whole, God’s exhaustive interpretation of this unitary whole (including his interpretation of every fact within this unitary system) is the one perfectly true interpretive system, the one perfectly true system of knowledge. God, therefore, is the ultimate principle of interpretation of all facts.”

I conclude chapter 1 with the following words about Van Til’s view: “God alone has such infinite knowledge. God alone eternally and fully understands himself as well as understanding every fact in relation to himself and in relation to every other fact. This is the starting point in Van Til’s system of apologetic thought.” (p. 51, emphasis added for this post).

Here I have clearly and unambiguously said that the starting point for CVT’s thought is God’s omniscience. And, I have stated twice Van Til’s point that God alone has this infinite knowledge. Everything that follows in the book should be read with this in mind.

Chapter 2 is titled “Creation and Revelation.”

My first mention of the creation of man is found on pages 55–56. Here, I explain that for Van Til: “Human beings have been uniquely created in the image of God. To be created in the image of God means, according to Van Til, that God’s ‘rationality’ is stamped upon all mankind. However, although God’s rationality has been stamped upon man, man remains a finite creature, which means that his knowledge is finite.” Then, on page 56, I quote Van Til to support this point. Van Til says that man’s knowledge “was, in the nature of the case, true, though not exhaustive.”

Observe that in this first mention of Van Til’s view of man’s knowledge, I clearly state his view than man’s knowledge is finite because man is a finite creature. I concluded my discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of God by noting explicitly his claim that God alone is omniscient, and I open my discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of man by noting explicitly his claim that man is not and cannot possibly be omniscient. This isn’t ambiguous or vague.

On pages 56 and following, I discuss Van Til’s view of God’s general revelation and how all created facts are exhaustively revelational of God. This is followed by a discussion of what Van Til says about the attributes of general revelation. In a discussion of the perspicuity of general revelation, I remind the reader that Van Til says: “human beings are not omniscient” (p. 59). In other words, no omniscience thesis.

On pages 60–66, there is an important section titled “God’s Knowledge and Man’s Knowledge.” As the title indicates, I am taking several pages here to look closely at what Van Til teaches on this point. Given the fact that it is an entire section devoted to the topic, what is said here is clearly going to be foundational for what follows, and all that follows on this topic should be interpreted in light of this section.

I begin this section as follows: “The importance of the Creator-creature distinction to Van Til’s apologetic thought becomes more apparent when we examine the implications of this distinction for his understanding of the relationship between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. We recall that Van Til affirms that God is omniscient. God knows himself in one eternal act of knowing. God also fully knows all the facts he has eternally decreed and fully knows the relation of each fact both to himself and to every other fact” (p. 60). Right off the bat then, there is a simple reminder that God is omniscient. His knowledge is exhaustive.

I go on to explain that for Van Til, because every fact was decreed by God, facts are known truly only if they are known in relation to God (p. 61). This leads to a comment by Van Til that could be misunderstood were it not for all that he has already said. Van Til says that if we don’t take God as the final reference point, man would have to be the final reference point and in that case man would have to know everything. Without an omniscient God, man himself would have to be omniscient. He says this because of his belief that exhaustive knowledge has to exist somewhere if there is to be true knowledge anywhere. But he doesn’t say here that man is omniscient or that man has any possibility of being omniscient. Van Til has already made it abundantly clear that man is finite and that his knowledge, therefore, is necessarily finite. I then note Van Til’s conclusion, “Since man is a finite creature and cannot possibly know everything, God’s knowledge of everything is necessary in order for there to be true knowledge of anything” (p. 62). I have explicitly stated here that Van Til does not allow for even the possibility that man could be omniscient, and I have done so in the very context of a comment by Van Til that sounds like he’s saying man must be omniscient.

Van Til clearly states that humans don’t even need to be omniscient as long as God is omniscient (p. 62). This is followed by Van Til’s bovine illustration of this point – the point that man doesn’t have to be omniscient. As Van Til explains, God has exhaustive knowledge of the cow (p. 63). Man’s knowledge can’t be exhaustive. I explain that for Van Til, “Man’s knowledge of the cow is necessarily finite, and as such, if that knowledge is to be true, it must be grounded in exhaustive knowledge somewhere” (p. 63). Notice what I am saying that Van Til teaches and compare it to what the Reformed Forum insists that I am saying Van Til teaches. I am repeatedly making it clear that Van Til says man’s knowledge is finite and necessarily so. The Reformed Forum panel is repeatedly claiming that I say Van Til teaches that man must be omniscient. Man would only have to be omniscient if God did not exist, but even if God did not exist, man still could not actually be omniscient. He would exist in an epistemological vacuum unable to know anything.

I remind the reader again that Van Til says that God alone has that exhaustive knowledge necessary for the existence of any knowledge (p. 63). This brings me to a discussion of Van Til’s teaching on analogical knowledge. On page 64, I write: “According to Van Til, because human beings are created ‘knowers,’ they are analogical knowers. As such, their knowledge cannot be exhaustive. It can, however, be true.” Note again, Van Til says that the knowledge of human beings cannot be exhaustive. But he also says that it can, nevertheless, be true. Van Til says our finite knowledge can be true if it corresponds with God’s exhaustive knowledge (p. 64). He explains that God’s full comprehension “gives validity to our partial comprehension” (p. 64). Our comprehension is “partial.” It is not and cannot be exhaustive. Analogical knowledge is Van Til’s way of attempting to explain how human knowledge can be true in some sense even though it doesn’t fit his own idealist definition of true knowledge.

On page 65, I explain what Van Til says with regard to God’s knowledge as a “point of reference” (object of knowledge) vs. God’s knowledge as God’s awareness. In other words, I try to explain the difference between a fact of knowledge and an act of knowledge in Van Til’s thought. Man’s act of knowledge and God’s act of knowledge are never the same, but the facts that God decreed are the facts that man encounters in the world.

I conclude this section on God’s Knowledge and Man’s Knowledge by explaining Van Til’s assertion that man cannot fully replicate God’s system of knowledge. This is impossible because man’s mind is finite. Human knowledge can only be analogical – a finite reflection of an infinite original. Van Til’s entire doctrine of analogical knowledge rests upon the fundamental point that man’s knowledge cannot be exhaustive knowledge. This whole section is a clear refutation of the claim that I am arguing that Van Til says man must be or can be omniscient. And this section is foundational for everything else said after this. For the sake of completeness, allow me to note that in the conclusion to chapter 2, I write: “Human knowledge of facts is never exhaustive knowledge” (p. 67). That is what I am saying Van Til says, and it isn’t ambiguous. I do not say that Van Til taught the omniscience thesis.

Chapter 3 is titled “Man’s Fall and God’s Grace.”

On page 69, in a recap of what has been said to this point, I write about Van Til’s view: “God alone has this infinite knowledge.” I observe that creaturely knowledge for Van Til “could not possibly be exhaustive.” I explain that, for Van Til, “Creaturely knowledge is necessarily finite. Only the Creator is omniscient.” This is what I have been consistently asserting that Van Til teaches. No part of this can conceivably be read to say that I’m claiming that Van Til says human beings can be omniscient.

According to Van Til, fallen man knows God in one sense and doesn’t know God in another (ethical) sense (p. 73). In Van Til’s thought, “Not only does fallen man not know God because he suppresses that knowledge, but fallen man also knows nothing else truly because he rejects its God-decreed and God-created nature” (p. 74). Fallen man is not interpreting facts with God as the final principle of interpretation.

This brings us to another place that could lead to confusion if someone is not reading it in light of all that has been said about Van Til’s view to this point. I explain that the reason fallen man knows nothing else truly is related to Van Til’s idealist definition of true knowledge. After quoting a passage in which Van Til insists that fallen man does not even know flowers truly, I write: “But why is it the case that fallen man cannot know the flowers truly? For Van Til, this assertion is based on his definition of true knowledge as a unity in which knowledge of all things is necessary for a true knowledge of anything” (p. 74). Remember that for Van Til, exhaustive knowledge has to exist somewhere for true knowledge to exist anywhere. That fundamental premise is rooted in Van Til’s idealist epistemology. A man who reasons analogically can know the flowers because he makes God the final reference point and thus places the flowers against the background of God’s exhaustive knowledge of the flowers. The fallen man rejects God as the final reference point and thus does not place the flowers against this background of exhaustive knowledge that is necessary for any knowledge. Without God as that final reference point, exhaustive knowledge would have to exist in man for the flowers to be known truly. But that’s not possible, therefore the flowers cannot be known truly by the fallen man. The Van Til quotes I cite are not attempts to show that Van Til teaches that man is or can be omniscient. They are quotes that express the idealist understanding of true knowledge that is one of the assumptions behind everything he says about fallen human knowledge.

If the Reformed Forum panel has a problem with what Van Til says in these quotes, they should take that up with Van Til, not me. I reject the idealist definition of true knowledge because it’s unbiblical. Van Til adheres to it. These quotes simply illustrate how that idealist epistemological assumption underlies so much of what he teaches. But these quotes do not mean that Van Til teaches that finite man is or can be omniscient! Fallen man is obviously not omniscient. The issue is that he has rejected the only kind of human knowledge that can be considered true in any sense – namely (finite) analogical knowledge. Fallen man has to think analogically (not omnisciently) if he is to know anything, and fallen man refuses to do that. Fallen man makes himself, rather than God, the final principle of interpretation (p. 75).

At this point, I introduce a difficult feature of Van Til’s thought – his teaching regarding the knowledge fallen man has in spite of his univocal principle of reasoning. Van Til explains that sometimes fallen man’s interpretive principle lies “dormant” (p. 76). This leads to a discussion of Van Til’s view of common grace. Since this is another issue to which the podcast devoted a lot of time, I will come back to this below. I simply note here that in the conclusion to this chapter, I again state the same point about Van Til’s view. According to him man’s “knowledge could never be exhaustive, but it could be true if it corresponded to God’s exhaustive knowledge” (p. 84). So, with all due respect to those who are weary of the repetition, I do not affirm what the Reformed Forum panel is calling “the omniscience thesis.”

Chapter 4 is titled “Redemption and the Antithesis.”

On pages 86–88, I have a brief section titled “The Effects of Redemption on Human Knowledge.” According to Van Til, redeemed man now sees all facts in the light of God’s revelation. He engages in analogical reasoning again (p. 87). Van Til does not say that redeemed man is or can be omniscient. On pages 89–97, I discuss Van Til’s doctrine of the antithesis. With the introduction of redeemed human beings, we now have two kinds of people – the redeemed and the unredeemed, covenant keepers and covenant breakers (p. 89). On page 92, this leads to an important paragraph that begins as follows: “Recall that for Van Til, God is omniscient.” He has decreed all facts and has interpreted all facts. “Man’s knowledge is to be reinterpretive. Man’s knowledge is true knowledge if it corresponds with God’s knowledge, and it cannot do that if man assumes anyone or anything other than God as the final reference point for interpretation.”

According to Van Til, there are basically only two systems of thought (p. 94). “God’s perfect and infinite knowledge of himself and of all decreed facts in relation to himself and to every other fact is the foundational system of truth” (p. 94). In Van Til’s thought, “If there were no omniscient God, true knowledge would be impossible because true knowledge involves a knowledge of each fact in relation to every other fact, and only God has such infinite knowledge” (p. 94). Van Til assumes this idealist definition of truth in his explanation of why God’s knowledge (which alone is exhaustive) is necessary for any finite human knowledge to exist. His idealist definition is not a way for him to claim that finite man must be omniscient.

Whether Van Til is talking about fallen man or redeemed man, he never asserts that either one has infinite exhaustive knowledge. God alone has exhaustive knowledge, and in the strictest sense, that exhaustive knowledge alone is “true” knowledge. Both redeemed man and fallen man are said to have knowledge that is only “true as far as it goes.” Speaking of unbelievers, for example, Van Til says, “We are well aware of the fact that non-Christians have a great deal of knowledge about this world which is true as far as it goes” (Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 63). Speaking of believers, he says, “Complete knowledge of what a cow is can be had only by an absolute intelligence, i.e., by one who has, so to speak, the blueprint of the whole universe. But it does not follow from this that the knowledge of the cow that I have is not true as far as it goes. It is true if it corresponds to the knowledge that God has of the cow.^” (Survey of Christian Epistemology, pp. 1–2, emphasis added for this post).

Chapter 5 is titled “The Apologetic Implications of the Antithesis.”

In the conclusion to this chapter and to the entirety of Part One, I remind the reader that according to Van Til, God is omniscient. On the other hand, “Human beings are finite creatures, so even before the fall, man’s knowledge could not possibly be an exact replica of God’s infinite knowledge. Man’s knowledge, instead, was to be analogical to God’s knowledge” (p. 114). So, nowhere in Part One do I state or imply that Van Til says any human being is or has to be omniscient. I repeatedly state what Van Til says, namely, that God alone is omniscient. There is no omniscience thesis in the chapters of the book devoted to merely stating Van Til’s views.

But what about Part Two of the book? In Part Two of my book, I move from a pure description of Van Til’s teaching to critique. Do I assert in Part Two that Van Til teaches the “omniscience thesis”? The answer is No.

Chapter 6 is titled “Biblical Concerns.”

The first thing to note about the chapters in Part Two is that they assume everything in Part One. If someone starts with chapter 6 or 7 or any later chapter, that person will inevitably misunderstand the book. Part One is absolutely necessary for understanding Part Two. That said, there has still been confusion about why I proceed in the manner I do in chapter 6. I have written an entire blog post about this here. In that blog post, I explain why I take time in chapter 6 to show that the Bible says unbelievers know things even though I have already noted Van Til’s admission that unbelievers know things because of his qualifications of the absolute antithesis.

The reason I take time to emphasize what the Bible says is found in chapter 5. In chapter 5, we see that Van Til rests his case for the exclusivity of the presuppositional method on the absolute antithesis and the unqualified claim that unbelievers know no fact truly. Part of the purpose of chapter 6 is to (in effect) remind Van Til that he himself has said the antithesis is qualified in practice in the present age and that unbelievers do have some knowledge. I do this because these qualifications undermine the demand for the exclusivity of the presuppositional method because the demand is based on an unqualified absolute antithesis.

Getting back to the “omniscience thesis,” however, on page 122, I state Van Til’s idealist definition of true knowledge because that definition of knowledge is repeated by Van Til throughout his entire career, and it is one of the main points I want to show is unbiblical. My quoting of Van Til here and my explaining his idealist definition of true knowledge is not, however, a claim on my part that Van Til taught that man must be omniscient. This comment must be read in the context of everything already explained in chapters 1–5, and as we saw there, Van Til clearly rules out the possibility of human omniscience.

Chapter 7 is titled “Philosophical Concerns.”

On pages 144–145, I bring up Van Til’s idealist definition of true knowledge again and spend many pages discussing the various kinds of influence we might talk about when discussing idealist influence. Nowhere do I claim that Van Til says that man must be omniscient. In fact, on pages 159–60, I again make it clear that only God is omniscient. I add, “As creatures, human beings are finite, but Van Til says they can have true knowledge if their knowledge corresponds to God’s exhaustive knowledge” (p. 160). If they reason analogically, human beings can have “a finite reflection of God’s exhaustive system of truth” (p. 160). I explain that according to Van Til, “Man cannot have the same exhaustive knowledge of all facts that God has. All that man can have, according to Van Til, is a finite (i.e., non-exhaustive) reflection of God’s exhaustive system of knowledge” (p. 163).

In short, I do not shift from denying the omniscience thesis in Part One to affirming it in Part Two. I do not affirm it anywhere because Van Til did not affirm it anywhere. My book is seeking to interact with Van Til’s view. That thesis is not part of his teaching. Many times when he makes a statement that expresses or assumes the idealist definition of true knowledge, he will state it in such a way that, if read out of context, it might be understood to teach that idea, but I have labored to put those kinds of statements within his larger context which makes it impossible to interpret them in such a way. There is, therefore, zero justification for anyone to continue to assert that I say anything other than what I have clearly explained in these paragraphs. It was clear enough in the book itself. It was made even clearer in my response to the first podcast. It is beyond clear now.

The Reformed Forum podcasts have now devoted more than an hour combined on this non-issue, and it has forced me to spend way more than an hour responding to it. This is a point on which the panel and I agree. We all agree that Van Til did not teach this so-called “omniscience thesis.” Van Til didn’t teach it because it’s an insane idea that only someone who is completely delusional could say with a straight face. So, can we please drop this and move on to actual real issues? There is no good reason for this to continue to be an issue. I do not reject Van Til’s claim that God alone is omniscient. I do not reject his claim that human beings are not omniscient. Nor do I say that he taught otherwise on those two points. I am assuming that the claim made by the Reformed Forum to the effect that I attribute the omniscience thesis to Van Til has so far been due to simple misunderstanding with no sinful motivations. To continue to assert that I attribute the omniscience thesis to Van Til after all of this would, at this point, be pure slander, a blatant violation of the 9^th commandment, a blatant violation of all other biblical standards for Christian interaction, and entirely inconsistent with any form of Christian pastoral standards, Christian academic standards, or Christian broadcasting standards. I do not reject Van Til’s claim that God alone is omniscient and that man’s knowledge is necessarily finite.

What I reject is the idealist definition of true knowledge that he adopted because that view of knowledge is completely contrary to what Scripture says and assumes about knowledge and because it introduces incoherence and contradiction into our theology when it is adopted in any form. It certainly created problems within Van Til’s own system. It is the problems caused by the adoption of the idealist definition of true knowledge that I am critiquing in the book. Regardless of whether or not the Reformed Forum panel thinks it is possible for Van Til to have adopted this definition, that is what I believe he did, and if we’re going to be discussing my book, it would be helpful if we discussed what I am actually saying rather than what someone assumes I must be saying because they are reading me through their own preconceptions.

Is Propositional Influence Impossible?

This brings us to a point on which I and the Reformed Forum panel actually do disagree. I argue in my book that there is a “propositional influence” of idealism on Van Til’s thought. The Reformed Forum panel argues that this is impossible. So, this is a point that is actually worth discussing.

First, what do I mean by “propositional influence”? Despite appearances to the contrary, I am not interested in rewriting my entire book in this one blog post. I refer interested readers to chapter 7 of my book for a full explanation. Suffice it to say here that my introduction of this term was part of an attempt to begin to bring a little bit of clarity to the never-ending discussion of idealist influence on Van Til. For decades, Van Til’s critics and his defenders have argued about whether there is any evidence of idealist influence on his teaching. I thought it might be helpful if we could try to define our terms. In other words, if we’re going to talk about whether or not there is any evidence of idealist influence, it might be helpful if we defined what we mean by “idealism” and what we mean by “influence.”

After reading all the debates, I offered a suggested taxonomy of different types of influence we could discuss in this context: lexical influence, strategic influence, propositional influence, and systemic influence. I do not claim that this taxonomy is perfect. It is merely a starting point for discussion. On page 151, I explain my definition of each:

1.     Lexical Influence – In this case a theologian simply borrows philosophical terms and gives those terms Christian definitions.

2.     Strategic influence – In this case, the major questions asked and the major problems raised by a particular philosophical school set the agenda in some way for a theologian’s methodology.

3.     Propositional influence – In this case, a theologian borrows what he believes to be individual true teachings from a philosophical system and incorporates them into his theological system.

4.     Systemic influence – In this case, a philosophical system as a whole is adopted and then functions as a foundation for a theological system. This involves a complete synthesis of Christian theology with that philosophical system.

I observed that Van Til himself as well as many Van Tillians admit “lexical influence” and that, in my opinion, such an influence is not a serious problem. I also observed that Van Tillians also granted “strategic influence” and that this too is not, in my opinion, a serious problem. I then observed that some Van Tillians, such as Scott Oliphint and Gabe Fluhrer, claimed that there is evidence of “propositional influence.” Unlike the first two kinds of influence, this kind, if real, raises more significant questions. In my opinion, there is sufficient evidence in Van Til’s writings to say that there is lexical, strategic, and propositional influence of idealism on his thought. I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to say that there is a systemic influence. There have been critics of Van Til who disagree.

The Reformed Forum panel strongly disagrees with my claim that there is sufficient evidence in Van Til’s writings to say that there is propositional influence of idealism on his thought. The reason is because they believe that is inherently impossible to take an isolated element out of the system of idealism and replant it anywhere. Here is what one member of the panel says: “But when Bradley sums up the doctrine of internal relations and his notion of the absolute, he says everything, myself included, is essential to and inseparable from the absolute.” So, the “parts” of the idealist system, as it were, are inseparable from the whole. They are inseparable from the Absolute. The panelist then explains: “Here's what it means. It means that the nature and identity of the absolute is constituted by all of the evolving entities internally and dynamically related to it. This is why it's not possible to take these, quote unquote, elements of truth from these doctrines, internal relations and holism and the absolute, and transplant them into the Christian soil because it would eviscerate the central doctrinal concern that Van Til always gives us, the immutable triune creator.”

In short, it is not possible to take a perceived element of truth in idealism and replant it in Reformed soil because it is impossible to take any element of idealism without taking the whole. That means that it is impossible to replant epistemological holism without replanting the idealist Absolute along with it, and the idealist Absolute is a prime example of the correlativism that Van Til abhors. I’ll return to this below, but first I want to briefly address two additional points the panel makes in connection with the rejection of “propositional influence.”

In the first place, the panel goes on for a bit to discuss the idea of “borrowed capital.” They argue that to talk about Van Til replanting elements of truth from idealism gets everything backwards because if an unbelieving worldview has any elements of truth, those elements are “borrowed capital” from Christianity. I’m not sure that this has any real relevance to the debate over the possibility of “propositional influence” in Van Til given what the panel has already said about the inseparability of epistemological holism from the Absolute. If such inseparability is true, the idealists cannot have “borrowed” epistemological holism from the Christian worldview unless the Christian worldview also includes the idealist Absolute with which holism is inseparably intertwined.

Second, one of the members of the Reformed Forum panel goes on to say, “The second problem is, Dr. Mathison’s interacting with an article by Scott Oliphant. And he’s known as a Van Tillian interpreter, but that’s not a good interpretation of Van Til’s own view.” He continues, “I think sometimes when people are interacting with Van Tillians, they assume that people who are self-professed Van Tillians all agree. We don’t think that’s a good article, or that’s a good presentation or an understanding of this particular issue.” He concludes: “We don’t need to get into the details of that, but I just want people to recognize that there isn’t uniformity among people who call themselves sympathizers or interpreters of Van Til, Frame included. There are many others. That there are differences of opinion, differences of thought, differences of interpretation.”

Let me say, first, that I do recognize that there are different interpretations of Van Til and different "schools" of Van Tillianism. There’s an entire subsection in the Introduction to my book that surveys six different schools of Van Tillianism (See, Toward a Reformed Apologetics, pp. 20–24). But the fact that the panel brings this up in connection with this idea of “propositional influence” is important. They say I got this idea from Oliphint. I didn’t hear them mention that I also cite Gabe Fluhrer, but let’s say it’s Oliphint. Alright, then I got the idea that Van Til replanted idealist elements of truth from a man who taught Van Tillianism for over three decades at Westminster Theological Seminary itself, the epicenter of Reformed Van Tillianism. He’s taught a lot of students his interpretation of Van Til. Of course, the Reformed Forum interprets Van Til differently on this point.

But which interpretation of Van Til is the correct interpretation? Is Oliphint’s interpretation correct? Is the Reformed Forum's interpretation correct? Who makes this call? Bahnsen and Frame also disagreed in their interpretations of Van Til several decades ago. Which of them was correct. How do we know? Who makes that call? Do we ask John Frame? Which school of Van Tillianism has the correct interpretation of the kind of idealist influence (if any) that exists in Van Til? Is the Van Tillian B. A. Bosserman correct when he says on the first page of his book that Hegel is Van Til’s most significant philosophical influence? I would be digitally drawn and quartered and mercilessly mocked if I said that, but Bosserman says it and receives glowing endorsements by prominent Van Tillians on the cover of his book. Are Oliphint and Fluhrer correct in saying that Van Til replanted elements of idealism in Reformed soil? Who is right and who says? Did any Van Tillian challenge Oliphint or Fluhrer publicly on this point since either one first suggested it, or does it only become a crime against humanity decades later when a critic of Van Til suggests that it's true? On what grounds do I accept the Reformed Forum’s interpretation of Van Til over against Oliphint’s, or Dennison’s, or Anderson’s, or Bahnsen's, or Frame's? And if Van Tillians themselves cannot agree in their interpretation of what Van Til teaches, how do they know my interpretation is incorrect?

For now, I’m dealing with the Reformed Forum’s interpretation and, according to them, a propositional influence of idealism on Van Til is impossible for the reasons they stated in the podcast. I believe that there is sufficient evidence for the claim that there is propositional influence – specifically with regard to epistemological holism, and I remind the reader that (as noted in the paragraphs above) there is a significant school of Van Tillianism that agrees, so the Van Tillians really need to sort this one out among themselves and then I’d be interested to know what they conclude. But why do I say that there is propositional influence. Aside from what I've already set forth in my book, let me add a few comments.

First of all, as I mentioned in my initial March 3 blog post, separating something that is believed to be an element of truth in idealism from idealism-as-a-whole would be an impossibility only for someone who is self-consciously a fully consistent idealist. It would not necessarily be impossible for someone who rejects the idealist premise that philosophical systems are all or nothing affairs. In other words, while replanting epistemological holism might be theoretically impossible for an idealist like Bradley, it would not necessarily be impossible for Van Til, unless one wants to assert that Van Til was actually a fully systemic idealist.

Second, even if for the sake of argument we accept that philosophical idealism of this kind always entails inseparability, according to Van Til, no one is ever actually consistent in the use of their interpretive principle. Believers are inconsistent because of the remnants of sin. Unbelievers are inconsistent for a variety of reasons. In the present time, neither believers nor unbelievers have 100% consistent systems. This includes Van Til. He too, if his words apply to himself as well as to others, had elements of inconsistency in his thought. He wasn’t infallible. So, even if idealism entails inseparability, that doesn’t mean that inconsistent human thinkers aren’t going to separate elements of it anyway.

Put yourself in Van Til’s shoes for a moment. As a child, he was raised a Christian. He was catechized in the Reformed faith. Then in school, when he is older, he finds himself sitting under teachers who adhered to idealist philosophy. He becomes fascinated with idealist philosophy and wants to communicate with those who adhere to idealist philosophy. From a very young (and impressionable) age, he is constantly reading the works of the idealists. Idealism is regularly the topic of his writing. Throughout his earliest years in the academic world, he is immersed in idealism. To switch metaphors, it becomes part of the very air he breathes.

It is not terribly difficult to imagine how this young Reformed Christian might have thought during these formative years. He is constantly seeing these idealists claim that in order to know anything truly, one must know all things truly. He repeatedly sees their claim that omniscience is necessary. It’s not difficult to imagine him thinking: “They are correct to reject atomistic epistemology and say that in order to know anything, one must know all things, but that puts them in an impossible situation because man can’t be omniscient. It’s too bad they reject the Triune God because then they’d have a solution to this epistemological problem. If we just replaced the Absolute with the Triune God, we’d have something.” Now, I don’t have any documents proving that this was his process of thought in those years. It is speculation, but it is speculation based on many things he said in his writings repeatedly over the decades of his life.

Finally, whether we call it "propositional influence" or not, we have to do something with the fact that epistemological holism is a part of Van Til’s system of thought. It is assumed and stated throughout his life, from his earliest writings to his last writings. We have to account for that fact somehow. Given Van Til’s complete immersion in the writings of British idealists in the most formative years of his life and for decades afterward, the possibility that there is what I have labeled "propositional influence” cannot be brushed off as absurd. The origin of epistemological holism in his thought has to be explained. He never provided any exegetical evidence that he got it from the Bible. It’s just an ever-present assumption in his writings that he will regularly mention explicitly. The most well-known attempt to provide some support for the claim that epistemological holism is biblical is found in Richard Gaffin’s 1995 article on 1 Corinthians 2:6–16. If it could be established that epistemological holism is found in Scripture, then its presence in Van Til’s thought could be explained in that way. We could say that he got it from the Bible. I have already mentioned the piece I wrote in response to Gaffin. Suffice it to say that Gaffin does not succeed in demonstrating that epistemological holism is biblical. He succeeds only in arguing in a circle in a textbook case of eisegesis. Epistemological holism is not the biblical view of knowledge. If it were, the only thing that could count as knowledge at all would be God’s knowledge. As I go to lengths to demonstrate in chapter 6 of my book, there is an absolute antithesis between what the Bible assumes and says about knowledge and what Van Til’s idealist view assumes and says about knowledge. They cannot both be true. We have to choose between what Scripture teaches and what Van Til teaches.

Common Grace and the Knowledge of Unbelievers

The last topic that I need to address is common grace. On this point, the Reformed Forum panel is criticizing my claim that Van Til’s argument for the exclusivity of the presuppositional apologetic method is undermined to some extent by what he says regarding common grace. My point, in a nutshell is this. Van Til rests his argument for the exclusivity of the presuppositional method on a certain element of his doctrine of the absolute antithesis – the idea that believers and unbelievers have no facts or laws in common. When discussing the reasons why presuppositionalism is the only valid apologetic method for a Reformed Christian to use, he hammers on the absolute antithesis.

What slips into the background when he’s making the case for the exclusivity of the presuppositional method are all the qualifications he makes to the absolute antithesis when he’s not talking about apologetic method. When he’s not talking about apologetic method, he argues that the antithesis is absolute only in principle. It will be absolute in the case of concrete human beings only after the final judgment. During the present age, several factors, including common grace, qualify the antithesis. Because of the qualifications, unbelievers do know some facts and laws, and that knowledge can be said to be true as far as it goes.

I argued in my book that if what he says about the qualified antithesis is true, it fatally weakens his case for the exclusivity of the presuppositional method. That case rests on something that exists in this age only in principle. In concrete reality, God’s common grace restrains man from applying his evil hermeneutical principle consistently, and that principle sometimes lies dormant. Because of his inconsistent application of his hermeneutical principle, the unbeliever knows some facts about the world.

The Reformed Forum panel focuses in particular on my claim that “Due to common grace . . . fallen man is often not consistent with his own principle, and he does attain knowledge.” They say that “attain” is the key word, and then one of the panel members says, “We don't think this is what Van Til says. We don’t think he says that Common Grace enables the non-Christian to attain true knowledge.” In my opinion, a good portion of what follows in the podcast muddies the water because it turns from my claim that common grace enables the non-Christian to attain knowledge about things in the world to a lengthy discussion about the nature of unbeliever’s knowledge of God. Many of the Van Til quotes they start citing have to do specifically with the knowledge of God. That is an important issue, but it’s not the one I’m talking about at the moment when discussing how Van Til weakens his own case for presuppositionalism. In my opinion, it’s a red herring that clouds the point under examination. After some time, they finally introduce the unbeliever’s knowledge of things in the world and affirm a hard-core absolute antithesis. If you're going to remain committed to the presuppositional method, you don't really have any other choice. The drawback is that you have to downplay or deny what Van Til says about the knowledge of unbelievers that results from common grace. So, the Reformed Forum panel and I clearly disagree on the nature of the knowledge of unbelievers during the present age. Unsurprisingly, the panel concludes this lengthy discussion of common grace with the conclusion that “Dr. Mathison has missed the mark, and he's missed it rather widely.”

Since the focus of the argument that the panel is critiquing has to do with whether or not unbelievers attain any true knowledge as a result of common grace, I want to deal with that specific claim I didn’t pull that idea out of a hat. It is based on what Van Til himself writes. Let me begin with a 1949 article titled “Presuppositionalism, Part 2” Van Til writes:

You ask what person is consistent with his own principles. Well I have consistently argued that no one is and that least of all the non-Christian is. I have even argued in the very booklet that you review that if men were consistent they would be end products and that then there would be no more reasoning with them. However since sinners are not consistent, and have what is from their point of view an old man within them they can engage in science and in the general interpretation of the created universe and bring to light much truth. It is because the prodigal is not yet at the swine trough and therefore still has of the substance of the Father in his pockets that he can do that and discover that, which for the matter of it, is true and usable for the Christian.

Here Van Til is talking about that inconsistency that exists before the final judgment, and as a result of this inconsistency, sinners can “bring to light much truth.” They can “discover that, which for the matter of it, is true and usable for the Christian.” Remember, the Reformed Forum panel said, “We don't think this is what Van Til says. We don’t think he says that Common Grace enables the non-Christian to attain true knowledge.” Here Van Til speaks of unbelievers discovering and bringing to light much truth. Is the truth they discover something different than the truth a believer discovers? Are Newton’s laws of motion different things for the believer and the unbeliever or one thing if a believer discovers them and another thing if an unbeliever discovers them? If that were the case, how could the “truths” discovered by sinners be “usable for the Christian”? The facts or truths discovered and stated by any unbelievers have to be real genuine truths if they are to be usable for the Christian, and if they are real genuine truths that can be used by Christians, then they are something believers and unbelievers have in common and a point of contact.

Okay, but isn't it the case that Van Til doesn’t mention common grace explicitly here?

Yes, so let’s look at a few things Van Til says in his book A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Westminster Seminary Press, 2023). On pages 13–14, Van Til writes:

So far, then, as he carries through his principle, he interprets all things without God. In principle he is hostile to God. But he cannot carry through his principle completely. He is restrained by God from doing so. Being restrained by God from doing so, he is enabled to make contributions to the edifice of human knowledge. The forces of creative power implanted in him are to some extent released by God’s common grace. He therefore makes positive contributions to science in spite of his principles and because both he and the universe are the exact opposite of what he, by his principles, thinks they are.

It is common grace that restrains the unbeliever from using his interpretive principle consistently. This is what the previous block quote was talking about, so the implication is that Van Til was speaking there as well of something that has to do with common grace. But note what Van Til says here. It is because of common grace that the unbeliever is “enabled to make contributions to the edifice of human knowledge.” One can only make such a contribution if we are talking about true knowledge. Van Til observes that because of common grace, the unbeliever “makes positive contributions to science.” That’s not possible if the contributions aren’t true.

On page 35, Van Til writes:

Just now we spoke of “elements of truth” that may be found in the non-Christian diagnosis of sin and evil. This points to the necessity of qualifying the analysis of fallen man given above. What we have said of him is true only in principle. Fallen man does in principle seek to be a law unto himself. But he cannot carry out his own principle to its full degree. He is restrained from doing so. God himself restrains him; God is long-suffering toward him. He calls man to repentance. He keeps fallen man from working out the full consequence of his sin. Reformed theologians speak of this restraint of God upon mankind in general as due to common grace.”

So the context here is common grace – God’s restraint upon man. And notice also that it is Van Til, not me, who introduces the idea of "qualifying" the analysis of fallen man. Now, on page 36, Van Til writes:

Thus it comes to pass that they of whom Scripture says that their minds are darkened can yet discover much truth. But this discovery of truth on their part is effected in spite of the fact that in principle they are wholly evil. Their discovery of truth is adventitious so far as their own principle is concerned. They are not partly evil, they are not just sick; they are wholly evil, they are spiritually dead. But in spite of being dead in sins, they can, because of God’s common grace, discover truth. The universe is what the Scripture says it is, and man is what the Scripture says he is. On both of these points it says the opposite of what fallen man says. Fallen man knows truth and does “morally good” things in spite of the fact that in principle he is set against God.

Note what Van Til says: Unbelievers “can, because of God’s common grace, discover truth.” Recall the claim I made that caused such consternation. My claim was that “Due to common grace . . . fallen man is often not consistent with his own principle, and he does attain knowledge.” This is what Van Til says in these quotes, only paraphrased in my words. Yet, the Reformed Forum panel said, “We don't think this is what Van Til says. We don’t think he says that Common Grace enables the non-Christian to attain true knowledge.” They accuse me of putting this idea into van Til’s mouth. No. It’s precisely what Van Til says. Unbelievers, Van Til says, “can, because of God’s common grace, discover truth.” In other words, in their interpretation of Van Til on this particular point, the Reformed Forum panel has missed the mark and has missed it rather widely.

Conclusion

I apologize for the length of this post, but these podcasts to which I am responding are very long and detailed, and the issues involved are complex and cannot be discussed in any coherent way in a Twitter/X format. I assume that those who are interested in the debate do not really mind the length of the podcasts or the length of my blog post responses. Those who are not interested are not required to listen to or read either.

By the time anyone reads this, it will be near Christmas or New Year, so I pray that every reader of this blog has a blessed new year, and I pray that by God's grace every reader of this blog will grow in conformity to Christ and follow him more and more faithfully every day.

Soli Deo Gloria.

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 Dec 23 Edit: To clarify a point made above: I got the idea that there is a "propositional influence" of idealism on Van Til from reading all of Van Til's works. I got the idea that some significant Van Tillians grant this kind of influence from Oliphint and Fluhrer. One comment made in the post above on this issue is made for the sake of argument. In other words, I'm saying, "Okay, for the sake of argument, let's say that the Reformed Forum is right in saying I got the idea from Oliphint." I don't think I made that perfectly clear in the post above.